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Using a balanced panel of firm-level data on the manufacturing industry in France, Italy and Spain 
over the 1993-1997 period, this paper examines the impact of foreign presence on the productivity 
of domestic enterprises. We innovate on existing literature by using firm-level data comparable 
across countries. A generalisation of the results obtained for individual countries is attempted by 
introducing two key variables in the analysis of the impact of inward investments on domestic 
performances: productivity gaps between foreign and domestic firms, and productivity levels of 
MNEs. It is shown that it is the combination of high gaps and high levels of foreign productivity 
that has the most positive effects. This leads to a critical consideration of both the “catching up” 
hypothesis, which identifies a positive relation between the size of technological gaps and growth 
opportunities induced by foreign investments; and the “technological accumulation” hypothesis, 
which stresses the role of domestic absorptive capacity and of coherence between foreign and 
domestic technology as determinants of virtuous effects of inward investments. Based on these 
results, policy implications are drawn, concerning the selection and promotion of inward 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper addresses the issue of how inward investments affect the productivity of 
European firms. We concentrate our attention on a panel of manufacturing firms active in France, 
Italy and Spain over 1993-97. Using longitudinal firm-level data is a key asset of this study, in 
accordance with some of the most promising research lines developed on the effects of FDIs. In 
fact, earlier contributions using cross-sector data were typically unable to control for differences in 
productivity across sectors, which might be correlated with, but not determined by, foreign 
presence. More recent works, using firm-level data, were able to control for factors influencing 
productivity independent of foreign investments, and to isolate the effects of foreign presence on 
the performances of local firms (Aitken and Harrison 1999, Blomstrom and Sjoholm 1999, Barrios, 
1999).  
Building on this literature, the paper presents at least two motives of interest. First, it utilizes 
a combination of firm level data-sets which allows to compare the effects of multinational presence 
across different countries. The characteristics and comparability of the available data permit us to 
overcome one of the most recurrent limits of previous studies based on micro-data, which were 
typically focused on single host economies, and were thus unable to highlight country specific 
effects of inward investments. Empirical tests highlight that inward investments may have a 
different impact across countries: observed effects are positive for Italy, negative for Spain and non 
significant for France.  
Second, a generalisation of results obtained for individual countries is attempted.  We shall 
highlight how the technological level of multinationals and the distance between domestic and 
foreign productivity affect the generation of externalities by multinational enterprises. It is the  
combination of high technological levels of multinationals and of high gaps that leads to the most 
positive impact of inward investments in the case of the examined countries. This leads to a critical 
consideration of both the “catching up” hypothesis (Findlay 1978, Wang and Blomstrom 1992), 
which identifies a positive relation between the size of technological gaps and growth opportunities 
induced by foreign investments; and the “technological accumulation” hypothesis (Cantwell 1989), 
which stresses the role of domestic absorptive capacity and of coherence between foreign and 
indigenous technology (Kokko 1994) as determinants of virtuous effects of inward investments. In 
fact, it will be suggested that, once the discussion on the impact of foreign presence shifts from 
LDCs to more advanced countries as recipient of direct investments, it is more likely that domestic 
firms are close to, or even beyond, the foreign technological frontier. A mere consideration of 
technological gaps may then be misleading, and the actual technological level of foreign firms must 
be controlled for. Furthermore, market stealing strategies are most likely when peer level firms 
compete in the same market, thus reducing the potential for technology transfer and linkages 
between multinational and local firms when gaps are low.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly summarises the theoretical and 
empirical literature background to this paper. Section 3 identifies the issues to be discussed and 
hypotheses to be tested empirically. Section 4 describes our data, variables and econometric 
specification. Section 5 discusses the main results of our econometric exercises. Section 6 
concludes the paper and draws some policy implications. 
 
 
2.  Background literature  
 
The past two decades have been characterised by a remarkable growth in flows of foreign 
direct investments by multinational firms, which have increased significantly faster than trade flows 
among the most developed countries, and became the largest source of external finance for 
developing countries. This process raises concerns about the role that multinationals play for host   3
countries development and performances. Economic literature has identified both positive and 
negative effects of multinational presence on recipient economies. On the one hand, MNEs may 
positively affect local productivity by training workers and managers who may move or spin off 
from foreign owned firms and become available to domestic enterprises (Fosfuri et al. 2001); by 
demonstrating the feasibility of new technology, providing technical assistance, transferring 
patented knowledge, and generating opportunities for imitation of technological, organisational and 
managerial practices (Mansfield and Romeo 1980, Dunning 1993); by creating demand for local 
inputs, increasing the specialisation and efficiency of upstream and downstream activities and 
generating positive externalities  for local industries (Hirschman 1958; Rodiguez-Clare, 1996; 
Markusen and Venables, 1999); and by exerting competitive pressures to improve the static and 
dynamic efficiency of domestic firms (Caves 1974, Cantwell 1989).  On the other hand, foreign 
presence may negatively affect productivity of local firms, particularly in the short run, to the extent 
that MNEs can monopolise markets and draw demand from domestic firms, causing them to cut 
production and reduce their efficiency (Aitken and Harrison 1999). Multinationals can also 
substitute local suppliers with foreign ones, disrupting existing linkages (Lall 1978).  
Whether the overall impact is negative or positive for host economies depends, by and large, 
on which of these tensions prevails. Rodriguez-Clare (1996) suggests that net linkage creation 
effects will be (positively) affected by the variety of intermediate inputs multinational firms can 
gain access to in local markets, as compared to their home market. It has also been argued that local 
capabilities and technical competencies spur multinational firms to interact with local partners, 
while they increase indigenous firms’ availability and ability to enter collaborations with foreign 
firms (Dunning 1958, Cantwell 1989). Besides, anti-competitive and market stealing effects may be 
particularly high when inward investments take the form of acquisitions (UNCTAD 2000). 
Empirical evidence concerning the overall effects of multinational growth on recipient 
countries is mixed. Using cross-country regressions Borensztein et al. (1995) show that FDI from 
developed countries stimulated domestic investment in LDCs, while UNCTAD (1999) reports that 
crowding in and crowding out effects of foreign investments tend to cancel out. Using cross-sector 
data, a number of studies have reported a positive impact of sectoral FDI on productivity (Caves, 
1974, Globerman, 1979, Blomstrom, 1989, Imbriani and Reganati, 1997, 1999). More recently, 
using firm-level longitudinal data with specific reference to a few developing countries, one rather 
robust result is that domestic firms with some foreign ownership exhibit better performance, such as 
higher productivity and wages, than purely domestic firms (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Aitken, 
Harrison and Lipsey, 1995; Blomstrom and Sjoholm, 1999). The hypothesis that multinational firms 
can act as export catalysts has also received some support (Aitken, Hanson and Harrison, 1997), 
while the effects of FDIs on domestic firms’ productivity often turn out to be not significant, or 
even negative, when controlling for industry dummies (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Aitken, 
Harrison and Lipsey, 1995; Haddad and Harrison, 1993). One exception is Blomstrom and Sjoholm 
(1999) who find evidence of significant economic benefits to domestic firms from sector FDI, but 
the degree of foreign ownership does not affect the extent of these benefits.  
As far as the analysis of mechanisms underlying the positive or negative effects of 
multinational firms, the evidence is even less conclusive, and this is mainly due to lack of 
appropriate data. Using country level time series and panel data for a sample of OECD and non-
OECD countries, De Mello (1999) finds that the extent to which FDIs are growth enhancing 
depends on the complementarity and substitution between FDI and domestic investment. A few 
studies based on firm level data have produced some evidence on the creation of linkages as a result 
of multinational presence (Dunning 1993, Blomstrom and Kokko 1998, Castellani and Zanfei 
2001). However,  the actual transmission from linkage creation to productivity and growth of 
domestic firms is not clearly documented. With reference to Venezuela, Aitken and Harrison (1999) 
show that the negative overall effect of foreign presence on the productivity of domestic firms is by 
and large determined by a contraction of domestic output, which they interpret in terms of a market 
stealing effect.    4
One oft-cited condition favouring a positive impact of inward investments on domestic 
firms’ productivity has to do with the role of technological gaps between foreign and domestic 
firms. On the one hand, some works put forward the idea that the larger the productivity gap 
between host country firms and foreign-owned firms, the larger the potential for technology transfer 
to the former. We label this view as the “catching up hypothesis” (Findlay, 1978). Consistently with 
this hypothesis, Blomstrom and Wolff (1994) find evidence that the growth of gross output per 
employee of locally owned firms in Mexico in 1970-75, is positively related to a measure of FDIs 
and of initial labour productivity gap between locals and multinationals. In a similar vein, Driffield 
(2001) shows that changes in value added per employee in the foreign sector, over 1986-89, 
positively affect productivity growth of domestic firms in the UK, and interpret this as evidence of 
catching up of local manufacturers stimulated by higher level competitors. On the other hand, 
scholar have argued that the lower is the technological gap between domestic and foreign firms, the 
higher is the relative absorptive capacity of the former, the higher are the expected benefits in terms 
of technology transfer to domestic firms. We label this as the “technological accumulation 
hypothesis” (Cantwell, 1989). The analysis of the responses of local firms to the entry and presence 
of US multinationals in European markets over 1955-75 seems to suggest that the most positive 
impact occurs in industries where the technological gap is small (Cantwell, 1989). This is consistent 
with the view that relatively low technological differentials between domestic and foreign firms 
would grant higher ability of local economies to capture technological opportunities and to respond 
to the stimuli created by MNEs. Kokko (1994) focuses on 156 industries that hosted MNEs in 
Mexico in 1970 and finds evidence that in industries characterised by both large technological gaps 
and large foreign market shares, which he identifies as “enclave sectors”, local productivity growth 
is significantly inhibited. His idea is that in such circumstances, MNEs are able to crowd out local 
competitors from the most important market segments, thus reducing the likelihood that positive 
benefits accrue to, and are captured by, local firms. In a more recent work on Uruguayan 
manufacturing plants Kokko, Tansini and Zejan (1996) find positive and statistically significant 
spillover effect only in the sub-sample of locally-owned plants with moderate technology gaps vis-
à-vis foreign firms. They argue that small or moderate gap, in the case of Uruguayan plants, identify 
cases where foreign technologies are useful to local firms and where local firms possess the skills 
needed to apply or learn foreign technologies. On the contrary, large gaps may signal that foreign 
technologies are too different from local ones that local firms have nothing to learn, or that local 
firms are so weak that they are not able to learn. Imbriani and Reganati (1997), analysing the Italian 
manufacturing industry, find that value added of domestic firms in sectors where the productivity 
gap between local and foreign firms is high is negatively related to foreign presence, while the 
opposite occurs where productivity gaps are low. Preliminary evidence from Portuguese sectoral 
data supports the idea that positive effects from f oreign presence might be associated with 
intermediate productivity gaps (Flores et al., 2001).  
To complete this brief review on the role of technological gaps, one should also mention the 
puzzling results obtained by Sjoholm (1997). Using detailed micro d ata from the Indonesian 
manufacturing sector in 1980 and 1991, he finds that the effects of labour productivity differences 
(after controlling for capital intensities and scale of production) vary according to the specification 
he adopts, so that no clear conclusion can be drawn on this issue. 
 
3.  Methodological issues and hypotheses 
 
Three issues are opened up by the reviewed literature and are worth some further empirical 
examination. First, it is apparent that the results of the examined studies cannot be easily compared 
due to the heterogeneity of data sources available, let alone the different methodologies adopted. 
Data heterogeneity is even more binding when the analysis is conducted at the firm-level, a problem 
which has often discouraged scholars from using micro-data for cross-country studies. Therefore,   5
using a uniform set of firm-level data to examine these phenomena across different countries will 
per se imply a considerable advancement.  
Second, obtaining sound evidence on the impact of FDIs on local firms requires the adoption 
of a key methodological choice, that is to control for fixed, time invariant factors which might affect 
productivity itself. As it is now widely acknowledged in recent literature, controlling for fixed 
effects is particularly important because FDIs typically follow a pattern of sectoral concentration 
towards more productive industries, implying that a positive association between foreign presence 
and the productivity of domestic firms could show up even if no spillover takes place. Failure to 
control for sector characteristics could then lead to mis-interpretations. The econometric 
specification adopted in this paper takes this issue into account (see section 4 below).  
  The third and final issue to be discussed before entering a detailed empirical analysis 
concerns the role of productivity gaps in the generation of externalities from inward investments. 
Most studies addressing this issue focus on LDCs as recipient countries. When the attention shifts 
to more advanced countries, the analytical framework must be modified from at least two points of 
view. On the one hand, one cannot presume that MNEs always represent the technological frontier 
as opposed to domestic firms lagging behind. When dealing with foreign investments directed 
towards developed countries, like the ones considered in this paper, technological gaps can thus be 
expected to be significantly lower, on average, than in the case of LDCs, with domestic firms often 
representing the most advanced ones in the market. Therefore, assessing the role of technology gaps 
as a determinant of FDI spillovers will not be possible without considering which of the firms – the 
foreign or the domestic one - is “stronger” in terms of productivity (see section 4 below for the 
statistical methodology we used to take this issue into account).  
On the other hand, given the higher technological proximity between foreign and domestic firms 
active in Developed Countries (as opposed to the case of LDCs), competitive threats can be 
expected to be higher. Appropriation of rents stemming from high and increasing productivity thus 
appears to be more sensitive an issue in these markets. By contrast, degree of “appropriateness” of 
foreign technology, as constraints to innovation adoption and diffusion, is much less binding in the 
case Developed Countries (again, relative to LDCs).  
The overall implication is that neither high productivity levels of foreign firms (which is the factor 
stressed by the catching up hypothesis) nor low technology gaps (which is the condition emphasised 
by the “technological accumulation hypothesis”) can by themselves shape the effects of FDIs on 
domestic firms.  
At the risk of drawing an over-simplified picture, we could identify two basic, opposite cases. The 
first one is characterised by both High Gap  and High Foreign Productivity Level. Under this 
circumstance we may expect an overall positive impact of FDIs on domestic firm performances. In 
fact, High Foreign Productivity will ensure a considerable potential for technology transfer from 
foreign to domestic firms; while relatively High Gaps will guarantee MNEs that they will have to 
undergo relatively low efforts to appropriate the rents of their superior technology. This will 
increase their availability to supply technology to domestic competitors, e.g. through exchanges of 
knowledge assets against access to local markets.  
The second, and opposite, case would be one characterised by Low Gap  and Low Foreign 
Productivity Level. Under this circumstance, we can expect that FDIs will have an overall negative 
impact on local performances. In fact, Low Foreign Productivity implies that MNEs will have 
relatively little technology to supply to domestic firms: domestic firms’ technology turns out to be 
more attractive for foreign firms, than viceversa, thus opening up take-over opportunities in the host 
market. Low Gap entails that MNEs will have to make great efforts to appropriate the rents of their 
own productivity: they will have to protect their own technology much better than in the previous 
case and this will further reduce the potential for technology transfers from foreign to domestic 
firms. 
 
4.  Data, variables and econometric specification   6
 
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of manufacturing firms active in France, Italy 
and Spain. The sample is the result of the intersection of two commercially available databases, 
Amadeus and Who Owns Whom
1. From the former source we obtained most economic and 
financial data used for our analysis, while from the latter we gathered information on the ownership 
structure (domestic vs. foreign) of each firm. The overall sample contains 4,514 firms, out of which 
2,121 are located in France, 1,226 are located in Italy and 1,167 are located in Spain. Foreign firms 
represent slightly less than one quarter of total firms in Italy, and between 35 and 40% in the other 
two countries (see Table 1 for other descriptive statistics on sample firms). A chi-squared test 
rejects the hypothesis that the sectoral distribution of firms in each country which we extracted from 
our database is significantly different from the distribution of the population of firms with more 
than 50 employees, as registered by different official sources of industrial statistics (Eurostat, and 
ISTAT)
2. For every firm located in the 3 countries we were able to identify the ultimate parent 
company, and with this information we have distinguished foreign-owned firms (when the ultimate 
parent company is different from the country of registration) from domestic firms. Economic and 
financial data were available for a 5 -year time span, from 1993 to 1997. Firms for which the 
complete series of data was not available were preliminarily dropped, thus the sample available for 
estimation is a balanced panel of 22,570 observations (of which 15,010 refer to domestic firms) for 
the three countries altogether. All data used for regressions and descriptive statistics are drawn from 
this combined data-set, unless otherwise specified. 
  
Dependent variable: log(TFP)it 
 
The dependent variable used in estimation is the log of total factor productivity (TFP) of firm i, 
which has its core business in sector j (3-digit SIC), at time t. TFP is defined as the residual of a 
log-linearised Cobb-Douglas production function of the following form: 
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where Y is real value added, L is the number of employees, K is the stock of capital and M 
is the use of raw materials and energy. TFP is modelled as the sum of a time-invariant component 
h, which captures inter-firm differences in productivity that are constant over time, and a time-
varying part e, which is assumed to be uncorrelated with input use and has the properties of the 
usual error term. Real values of Y, K and M are obtained by deflating respectively nominal value 
added (total turnover subtracted the cost of materials), book value of fixed assets net of 
depreciation, and costs of materials. The deflator used is the OECD-STAN implied sectoral value 
added deflator. Output elasticities of labour, capital and materials are estimated running within-
group regressions for each country separately, and the TFP measure is calculated as the difference 
between actual and predicted output: 
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i = 1, … N
j;  
t = 1993, … 1997; 
j = Spain, France, Italy 
                                                            
1 Amadeus and Who Owns Whom (D&B  Linkages) are products of Bureau Van Dijck and Dun & Bradstreet 
respectively. 
2 We are grateful to L. Nascia for supplying background data for these comparisons.   7
 
The econometric specification used to test for the existence of productivity effects from 
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where i, t and j are as above, 
s = 201, … 399 (3-digit SIC); 
 
FDI is a measure of foreign presence in the 3-digit SIC, which represents the core business 
of firm i, X is a vector of time varying sectoral controls, lis is an unobserved firm (and sector)- 
fixed effect, nist is the error term. Regression is performed using a standard within-group estimator, 
to avoid that correlation between the fixed effect and measures of FDI would cause a biased 
estimation of the FDI effect
3. As it has been suggested earlier, FDIs might be attracted by the 
productivity levels of sectors thus failing to control for the average productivity of the firm (and the 
sector) will show up in a magnified coefficient on the FDI variable. In particular, if FDIs are 
attracted towards more productive sectors, OLS estimates are likely to find higher impact of FDIs 
on TFP 
4. On the contrary, if FDIs are attracted towards sectors where domestic firms are relatively 
laggard, one is likely to find robust evidence of negative impact of foreign presence. Indeed, 
correlation between the fixed effects and FDI variables is fairly high. In particular, in Italy we found 
evidence of a significant negative correlation, while in Spain we find evidence of positive 
correlation. These results suggest that foreign presence in Italy gravitate towards sectors where 
domestic firms are relatively less productive, while in Spain FDIs tend to be concentrated in more 
productive industries. Correspondingly, preliminary OLS regressions (not shown but available from 
the authors) support positive impact of inward investments in Spain and France and negative effects 
in Italy. Controlling for fixed effects, regressions yield significantly different results, shown in 




-  FDI_Sectorst:  is measured by the sum of workers employed at time t by all foreign-
owned firms (in the sample) whose core business is in sector s. In this way we are 
specifying effects from foreign investments as a specific source of external (within 
sector) economies. Other scholars have measured foreign presence in absolute terms, i.e. 
as the overall size of foreign activity in a given country. For instance, Barrel and Pain 
(1997), analysing the effects of inward FDIs on labour demand in the UK and Germany, 
measure foreign activity as the absolute sectoral stock of FDIs. Branstetter (2000) , in 
her study of Japan-US technology transfers, measures FDIs as the cumulative counts of 
all Japanese subsidiaries in the US. Driffield (2001) criticises the use of absolute 
measures of FDIs (as opposed to relative measures, such as the number of  employees of 
foreign firms divided by total employment in a given sector), because they will vary with 
the size of sectors and hence bias estimates. To solve this problem, we also control for 
Domestic Employment (see below). With this caution, our estimates should not be 
                                                            
3 A random-effect model was tested against the fixed-effect model, but Hausman tests rejected the null for every 
subsample, even after controlling for sectoral dummies. 
4 In a preliminary work on sectoral panel data from Portugal, Flores et al. (2001) obtain exactly this result. OLS 
regressions, without controlling for fixed effects, yield positive (although still mixed) effects of foreign presence on 
domestic productivity. Once controlled for sector dummies, the coefficient on foreign presence turns out negative.   8
biased by the size of sectors, and we can disentangle the effect on domestic productivity 
of both foreign and domestic sectoral activity
5. 
 
Control variables: Xst 
 
-  Growth of Real Value Added is the growth rate of the sectoral value added, obtained as 
the sum of value added of all sample firms in sector s. It is introduced to capture the 
effect on domestic firm’s productivity that is due to changes in demand 
-  Herfindal is the concentration index of sector s, calculated as the sum of squared market 
shares of each firm in sector s. It is intended to capture the degree of competition in the 
industry, which should impact on domestic firm’s productivity 
-  Domestic Employmentst, is the sum of employees at time t of all domestic firms in the 
sample whose core business is in sector s. It has been used to control for the possibility 
that a positive impact of this latter measure would not be simply the result of the size of 
the industry.  
See Table 2 for a summary of the main descriptive statistics of these variables. 
 
 
5.  Discussion of results 
 
  Regressions were run with Total Factor Productivity (TFP) as a dependent variable. We 
used the Fixed Effects Model (Within Groups Estimator, WG) which allows to control for 
unobserved time invariant factors which may affect productivity, and enables to isolate the actual 
impact of Foreign Presence among other independent (control) variables. Table 3 shows the results 
we have obtained with reference to the three EU countries, France, Italy and Spain, which we have 
considered separately to highlight the specific impact of inward investments on domestic firms 
productivity. We find no evidence of effects of inward investments on domestic firms’ productivity 
in France, a negative and significant impact in Spain and a positive and significant impact in Italy. 
There thus appears to exist a significant heterogeneity across countries as far as the impact of 
inward investment is concerned.  
It is important to observe that significant impacts of inward investments do show up in the 
case of Italy and Spain (although with opposite signs) in the presence of important controls. Of 
these the most significant for all countries is the growth of sector Value Added, as a measure of 
demand dynamics, which appears to be a key driver of productivity growth. Domestic employment 
in the e xamined manufacturing sectors is here introduced as a scale factor. It is negative and 
significant in the case of Italy, possibly signalling that in those sectors wherein domestic activities 
are most extensive, that is mainly traditional sectors, domestic firms’ productivity is lowest. Our 
measure of industrial concentration, the Herfindal Index calculated for each national market, is 
significant only in the case of Italy, where a negative impact is shown. It thus appears that, in the 
case of Italy, unlike  the other two countries, the degree of concentration (which is obviously 
inversely related to the degree of competition) is a relevant inhibitor of productivity growth. 
   Why are we observing such differences in the actual impact of inward investments on TFP 
in the examined countries? There certainly are diversities in the institutional and structural features 
of the three economies which ought to be examined in details. Amongst other factors, important 
insights can be drawn from the  analysis of how the three countries differ in terms of technological 
                                                            
5 Alternatively, we used the share of foreign to total employment at time t in sector j (3-digit SIC). Such a measure of 
FDI, which has also been used extensively in works on spillovers from FDIs, proved to be more sensitive to model 
specification. Results of these regressions are not shown in this paper but are available from the authors upon request. 
Below in the text, we show results from regressions using the absolute size of foreign sectoral employment, which we 
consider as more stable and robust.  
   9
levels of both the domestic and the foreign firms. Table 4 highlights a fundamental difference 
emerging in this respect. Spanish firms exhibit the lowest average TFP, while French firms are 
characterised by the highest TFP, and Italian firms constitute an intermediate case. Foreign firms 
are very productive on average in Italy, although with a rather high variability, while in Spain 
foreign TFP is the lowest. If we now turn to examining TFP gaps which, for the time being, we will 
define as the difference between average foreign TFP and average domestic TFP (see below for a 
more careful definition used in regressions), it is shown that in Italy the distance between domestic 
firms’ TFP and foreign firms’ is the highest. In Spain and France, the two groups of firms are 
relatively close in terms of TFP. As already noted, however, in Spain the average level of foreign 
firms is lower. Details by broad sectors (resulting from the aggregation of the 3 digit sectoral 
distribution of firms adopted for our regressions) are offered in table 4, which also highlights that in 
a number of industries domestic firms do represent the technological frontier, with foreign firms 
lagging behind. This confirms our line of arguments in section 3, concerning the need of a careful 
consideration of gaps between foreign and domestic firms when advanced countries are examined. 
 
The above description of stylised facts concerning the three countries induces us to attempt a 
generalisation of our results, which takes TFP levels and gaps into account. Table 5 illustrates this 
attempt. It contains a set of regressions we ran after dividing our sample into 6 sub-samples, 
combining domestic firms according to the average TFP level of foreign firms active in a given 
sector, and to the distance that we observe in each of these sectors between domestic firms and 
foreign firm productivity 
6. We then identified the impact of foreign presence in these sub-samples 
of domestic firms.  
More precisely, Foreign Productivity level (Foreign_TFPjst) is defined as the mean of TFP 
of foreign firms in country j in a given sector s at time t. We have defined a sample of high (low) 
Foreign TFP firms, whose core business is characterised by a value of Foreign TFP (averaged over 
time) above (below) the median.  
Productivity Gap (TFP_Gapist) is defined as the percentage distance between the TFP of 
firm  i active in sector  s from the  indicator of foreign TFP we have described above 














_ .  
It takes positive values if the average foreign TFP in the sector is higher than firm’s TFP 
(i.e. if a sample firm is relatively less productive than the mean TFP of foreign firms in the sector), 
value zero if the (domestic) firm and the average foreign TFP are exactly equal, while it takes 
negative values if the domestic firm is more productive than the average foreign. In the extreme 
case of sectors where no foreign firms are active, TFP Gap takes value equal to –1. It is worth 
noting that TFP_Gap is calculated for each firm relative to a sectoral benchmark, represented by the 
average TFP of foreign firms in that sector. Therefore, gaps refers to firms more than to sectors and 
each industry we can find both domestic firms very close to foreign firms’ average productivity or 
very far. We have defined High TFP Gap firms, those firms whose average TFP Gap (over time) is 
higher than the 66
th percentile, Low TFP Gap firms when below the 33
rd percentile (and 
Intermediate TFP Gap firms when between the 33
rd and the 66
th).  Any criteria to split the sample 
would share some degree of arbitrariness, we have chosen the one which allows to build subsamples 
of equal size: one third of firms is in each of the three TFP_Gap groups and half of the firms is in 
the two Foreign_TFP groups. Unfortunately, when we use the two criteria jointly, the number of 
firms in each group need not to be equal. Comfortingly, the Chow-like test (developed in Appendix) 
for the division of the sample presented at the e nd of Table 5, soundly rejects the hypothesis 
                                                            
6 To control for the appropriateness of this division of the sample, we have adapted a version of the Chow test to 
multiple breaks in panels, when breaking occurs over individuals rather over time (see Appendix for the exact 
specification of the test).   10
coefficients obtained in the 6 subsamples are equal to the coefficients estimated in the pooled 
regression, thus supporting our division of the sample. 
 
Consistently with the hypotheses discussed in section 3, it turns out from Table 5 that it is 
the combination of (medium)-high gaps with high level of foreign TFP that is associated with a 
positive and significant impact of FDIs. This seems to correspond to the idea that, under these 
circumstances, MNEs have much technology to supply, and face relatively low costs at protecting 
their technology. They will thus be relatively available to enter linkages with local firms, to accept a 
certain mobility of workers, and even exchange skills and knowledge with domestic firms. This 
could roughly correspond to the story of Italy in our results of table 3. 
The case of (low) intermediate gaps combined with low foreign TFP is associated with negative (or 
no) effects of foreign presence. This could be consistent with the expectations we have illustrated in 
section 3: A low potential supply of technology and high appropriation efforts, lead MNEs to avoid 
interactions with, and reduce transfers of knowledge to, domestic firms. This story could correspond 
to what we showed in the case of Spain in table 3.  
We do indeed find evidence of a third category, characterised by Low Gap and High Foreign TFP, 
wherein the impact of FP is barely significant and negative. This corresponds to the lowest number 
of observations (267). Although this result is not as sound as the other ones, one might observe that 
the negative sign in this case could be revealing of the importance of appropriability regimes and of 
technology protection costs that are associated to environments characterised by high technological 
competition. These features may prevent closer and effective interactions between foreign and local 
firms. 
To conclude this section, our results show that neither high foreign TFP levels (which was 
emphasised as a key condition in the “catching up hypothesis” discussed in section 3) nor the low 
gap (which was stressed by the “Technological accumulation hypothesis” discussed in section 3) 
can by themselves generate the conditions for a positive effects of FDIs on local firms. It is the 
combination of high foreign TFP levels with high gaps that increases the likelihood that local firms 
benefit from foreign presence. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
  This paper has attempted to provide a contribution to the debate on the impact of inward 
investments, a phenomenon that has been accelerating in Europe since the early 1990’s. We 
innovated on existing literature by providing a wide-spectrum analysis of this aspect of 
globalisation in three EU countries, using comparable data. We attempted a generalisation of the 
results obtained for individual countries by introducing TFP gaps between foreign and domestic 
firms, and TFP levels of MNEs as key variables determining the impact of multinational presence 
on domestic performances. It was shown that it is the combination of high gaps and high levels of 
foreign productivity that leads to the most positive effects of inward investments.  
Based on these results, policy implications are quite different from the usual ones. When 
dealing with developed economies as recipient countries, as it is the case in this paper, it is not so 
much a matter of promoting FDIs in industries where local technology gaps are. This might be the 
case with LDCs as host economies, where governments face the key issues of improving the 
existing absorptive capacity, and of avoiding the imposition of less appropriate technology. Using 
the same approach would probably be misleading when considering Developed countries, i.e. 
economies that are characterised by a relatively high number of firms that are close to the 
technological frontier. Indeed, these countries are most likely to take advantage from a selection of 
multinationals carrying out high productivity activities in sectors wherein domestic firms would 
have a lot to learn, and new foreign technology to adopt. This means promoting the entry of MNEs 
that are active at the technological frontier, particularly where domestic manufacturers are relatively 
weaker, provided that appropriate antitrust and other competition policies are adopted to reduce the   11
risks of monopolisation in these markets. This choice would not only increase the potential of 
technology that could be transferred from MNEs to local firms; it would also reduce the costs 
foreign firms would face in order to protect their own technology, which can be expected to 
increase their availability to actually supply and exchange knowledge and expertise to the 
advantage of local firms.  
Of course, policies favouring positive externalities from inward investments cannot be 
limited to the selection of sectors in which multinational presence should be favoured. A whole set 
of measures could and should be utilised, such as the modernisation of infrastructures, human 
capital formation, “after-care” policies and the support of local firms, including suppliers of MNEs. 
It remains that investment selection and promotion, especially if combined with complementary 
pro-competitive and infrastructural policies, should be re-considered in the agenda of national and 
supra-national governments, as a key tool to enhance industrial growth.  
 








Table 1 – Characteristics of our sample of French, Spanish and Italian manufacturing firms, by ISIC sectors at 1995 
   Number of firms   Share of Foreign Firms  Foreign Employment 
Foreign Employement 
(% of Total Manufacturing) 
Foreign Employment / 
Total Employment 
Isic  Spain  France  Italy  Spain  France  Italy  Spain  France  Italy  Spain  France  Italy  Spain  France  Italy 
Basic Metal Industries  51  102  73  13.7%  32.4%  12.3%  1.913  11.009  2.914  0.7%  3.6%  2.1%  9.3%  23.1%  12.4% 
Chemical Products  194  245  152  64.9%  46.5%  45.4%  41.963  40.302  27.112  15.7%  13.1%  19.2%  67.0%  50.0%  48.1% 
Electrical Machinery  93  176  97  57.0%  39.8%  29.9%  34.186  36.882  20.016  12.8%  12.0%  14.1%  64.7%  30.5%  38.7% 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco  205  270  82  27.3%  17.4%  19.5%  34.795  23.913  20.645  13.0%  7.8%  14.6%  36.4%  26.3%  50.4% 
Instruments  24  95  30  54.2%  43.2%  30.0%  4.225  16.982  1.264  1.6%  5.5%  0.9%  56.4%  44.5%  12.3% 
Metalworking  64  172  98  29.7%  24.4%  24.5%  3.971  10.330  9.754  1.5%  3.4%  6.9%  21.7%  20.3%  35.4% 
Non-Electrical Machinery  70  251  191  41.4%  47.0%  24.6%  18.638  59.642  24.913  7.0%  19.4%  17.6%  71.1%  55.1%  36.0% 
Non-Metal  73  90  71  31.5%  34.4%  16.9%  11.985  12.114  6.491  4.5%  3.9%  4.6%  46.7%  32.9%  23.9% 
Other Manufacturing  33  57  31  27.3%  21.1%  12.9%  3.402  3.506  775  1.3%  1.1%  0.5%  28.7%  23.7%  11.1% 
Paper, Paper Products & Printing  104  193  65  29.8%  35.2%  16.9%  9.142  24.146  3.181  3.4%  7.9%  2.2%  32.3%  37.9%  12.7% 
Petro  8  14  11  12.5%  64.3%  36.4%  754  5.186  2.827  0.3%  1.7%  2.0%  30.9%  32.2%  49.4% 
Rubber  77  145  90  55.8%  53.1%  26.7%  27.001  27.500  13.056  10.1%  9.0%  9.2%  80.2%  53.1%  42.9% 
Textiles, Apparel & Leather  68  165  171  17.6%  21.2%  3.5%  4.334  12.428  1.614  1.6%  4.1%  1.1%  15.4%  29.1%  2.9% 
Transport  91  100  56  60.4%  46.0%  28.6%  70.840  20.427  7.013  26.5%  6.7%  5.0%  61.1%  13.6%  4.5% 
Wood Products & Furniture  12  46  8    21.7%    -  2.370  -  0.0%  0.8%  0.0%  0.0%  23.0%  0.0% 
Total  1.167  2.121  1.226  40.9%  35.5%  22.8%  267.149  306.737  141.575  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  50.2%  33.2%  24.1% 
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Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics for regression variables 
Variable    Obs.  Mea
n 
Std. 
Dev.  Min  Max 
Log(TFP)  Spain  3450  -0.04  0.46  -2.01  2.12 
  France  6840  -0.02  0.52  -2.14  4.25 
  Italy  4730  -0.03  0.52  -4.50  3.11 
             
FDI_Sector
§  Spain  3450  0.31  0.73  0  4.60 
  France  6840  0.80  0.90  0  4.83 
  Italy  4730  0.60  0.92  0  4.27 
             
Domestic Employment
§  Spain  3450  1.28  1.05  0.02  7.14 
  France  6840  0.70  0.85  0.00  5.90 
  Italy  4730  0.50  0.91  0.00  7.18 
             
Growth of Real Value Added  Spain  2760  0.04  0.14  -0.96  0.85 
  France  5472  0.05  0.13  -0.83  1.05 
  Italy  3784  0.04  0.15  -0.65  0.93 
             
Herfindal Index  Spain  3450  0.18  0.17  0.03  1 
  France  6840  0.14  0.14  0.02  1 
  Italy  4730  0.20  0.17  0.02  1 





Table 3 – The impact of sectoral foreign presence on domestic firms productivity in France, 
Spain and Italy, 1993-1997 (within-group estimates) 
Dependent Variable: Log of TFP 
Sample: Only Domestic Firms 
Spain  France  Italy 






Domestic Employment in 3-digit SIC


















Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N. obs  2760  5472  3784 
N. firms  690  1368  946 












F-chow  3.20** 
(16, 8988) 
§ Expressed in standard deviation units 
t-statistics are in brackets below estimates. Asterisks indicates significance values (**: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1) 
F-slopes and F-fixed denote tests for equality to zero of parameter estimates and of the fixed effects respectively. F-chow denote a 





Table 4 – Average TFP of domestic and foreign-owned firms from French, Spanish and Italian manufacturing firms and TFP Gaps, by 
ISIC sectors at 1995 
  Average TFP of Domestic Firms*  Average TFP of Foreign Firms*  TFP Gap** 
(Foreign TFP - Domestic TFP) 
Isic  Spain  France  Italy  Spain  France  Italy  Spain  France  Italy 
Basic Metal Industries  1.42  1.13  1.16  1.09  0.93  1.01  -0.33  -0.20  -0.14 
Chemical Products  1.32  1.17  1.23  1.29  1.42  1.42  -0.03  0.26  0.19 
Electrical Machinery  0.97  1.28  0.80  1.19  1.27  1.30  0.22  0.00  0.49 
Food. Beverages & Tobacco  1.10  0.85  1.22  1.06  1.13  1.60  -0.04  0.28  0.38 
Instruments  1.09  1.25  0.95  1.28  1.08  1.20  0.19  -0.17  0.25 
Metalworking  0.94  1.07  1.14  1.01  1.00  0.96  0.07  -0.06  -0.18 
Non-Electrical Machinery  0.88  1.27  0.90  1.06  1.53  0.99  0.18  0.26  0.09 
Non-Metal  1.61  1.07  1.19  1.79  1.14  1.38  0.18  0.08  0.19 
Other Manufacturing  1.00  0.85  0.99  1.08  1.04  1.02  0.07  0.19  0.03 
Paper. Paper Products & Printing  1.33  1.51  1.25  1.10  1.38  1.04  -0.23  -0.13  -0.21 
Petro  1.13  3.80  4.72  3.64  3.22  6.05  2.51  -0.59  1.33 
Rubber  0.88  0.90  0.85  0.85  0.99  1.51  -0.03  0.10  0.66 
Textiles. Apparel & Leather  0.82  1.11  1.25  0.88  1.19  1.02  0.06  0.08  -0.23 
Transport  1.07  2.05  1.21  1.04  0.92  1.31  -0.03  -1.14  0.09 
Wood Products & Furniture  1.25  0.81  0.95    1.01    -1.25  0.21  -0.95 
Total 
mean 1.07  1.16  1.12  1.16  1.21  1.34  0.09 0.05 0.22
(s.d.) (.60)  (1.34)  (.77)  (.59)  (.85)  (1.82)       
* For the purpose of these descriptive statistics, foreign and domestic TFP are defined as the mean of TFP of domestic and foreign firms in each ISIC sector. Totals are the mean (and standard 
deviation) over all firms. thus they do not necessarily equal the mean of the sectoral values. 
** For the purpose of these descriptive statistics, TFP gaps are defined as the difference between mean foreign TFP and mean domestic TFP  
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Table 5 – The impact of sectoral foreign presence on domestic firms productivity. Subsamples 
by foreign TFP level and TFP Gap, 1993-1997 (within-group estimates) 
Dependent Variable: Log of TFP 


























































































Time Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N. obs  2896  2048  1076  1068  1912  3008 
N. firms  724  512  269  267  478  752 
























F-chow  2.63** 
(40, 8964) 
§ Expressed in standard deviation units 
t-statistics are in brackets below estimates. Asterisks indicates significance values (**: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.1) 
F-slopes and F-fixed denote tests for equality to zero of parameter estimates and of the fixed effects respectively. F-chow denote a 
“Chow-like” test for equality of coefficients across sub-samples (see Appendix). Degrees of freedom are in brackets below the 
statistic . 








ist TFP TFP TFP Foreing GAP - = _ . where  j
st TFP Foreign _  is the average TFP level of foreign firms in 
sector s and country j and  j
ist TFP  is the TFP level of (domestic) firm i. which operates is sector s and country j. Firms are defined as 
low gap if the time average of  j
ist GAP  is below the 33
rd percentile (-.15). high gap if it is above the 66
th percentile (.29) and 
intermediate gap if it is between the 33
rd  and the 66
th percentile. 
Firms are defined as being in High Foreign TFP sectors if  j
st TFP Foreign _ is above the median (1.01). while are defined as Low 
Foreign TFP if  j
st TFP Foreign _  is below the median.   16
 
Appendix – The test for break into groups of individuals 
 
In this paper we break our sample into groups of firms with sharing common characteristics (e.g. 
nationality,  TFP gap and TFP of foreign firms) thus we believe it is useful to test for the 
appropriateness of the various breaks. The following is an extension of the Chow test for structural 
breaks in the context of balanced panels (Baltagi, 1995 p. 49), when break is based on individuals 
rather than on time.  
Given a linear fixed-effect specification 
it i it it v D X y + + = h b
'  , for i = 1, …N and t = 1, …T 
where b’ is a 1 x K vector of parameters, Xit is a K x 1 vector of regressors, h is a 1 x N vector of 
individual effects, Di is a N x 1 vector of individual effects (1 element is equal to 1 and N-1 are 
zeros), nit is the error term, can be tested against a similar specification, which allows coefficients b 
to vary across groups of individuals. 
 
For example, 
it i it it v D X y + + = h b
'
1  , for i = 1, …N
1 and t = 1, …T 
it i it it v D X y + + = h b
'
2  , for i = 1, …N
2 and t = 1, …T 
… 
it i it M it v D X y + + = h b '  , for i = 1, …N
M and t = 1, …T 
with N
1 + N
2 + … N
M = N 
 
A test of the first model (restricted) against the system of unrestricted equations implies 
 
H0: b1 = b2 = …= bM 
 




MK N NT USSE
K M USSE RSSE
























where RSSE is the Sum of Squared Errors (SSE) in the unrestricted model, USSEm is the SSE in the 
m
th subsample, N is the number of individuals in the sample, T is number of time periods, M is the 
number of subsamples and  K is the number of parameters to be estimated. The statistics is 
distributed as an F with degrees of freedom MK–K and NT–N–MK.  
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